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Menghan YANG and Li ZHANG

Abstract
Does democracy cause higher economic growth? We build a model taking culture and
interpersonal cooperation into account and find that democracy increases economic
productivity through giving people more equal rights, which allows people to build a larger
interpersonal network so that they can reduce investment risk and employ high-productivity
(high-risk) methods in production.
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1. Introduction
Economists have for a long time been aware of the influence of democracy on economic
development. But theoretical and empirical studies on this topic are largely inconclusive.
Some economists think that democracy may harm economic development. They argue that
democracy increases demand for redistribution and increases current consumption that
consequently reduces investment and does harm to economic growth Huntington (1968);
Alesina and Rodrik (1991). Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), however, stress that redistribution
and democratization of a society do not necessarily have adverse effects on growth, as
redistribution may increase the level of human capital of the poor.
As well as the theoretical conflicts, most of the empirical studies find ambiguous impacts of
democracy on growth. According to a review of 16 empirical studies on the association
between democracy and growth reported by Borner and Weder (1995), three studies uncover
a positive relation, three negative relation and the remaining ten are inconclusive. Although
recent empirical studies employ more advanced econometric tools, there has not been a
definite conclusion. (Please see Aghion & Howitt (2009) for a review of the recent empirical
literature.)
We therefore try to re-study this topic from a new perspective, which takes culture and
interpersonal cooperation into account. We establish a model to show that democracy
increases economic productivity through giving people more freedom, which allows them to
build a larger social network to reduce investment risk so that they are willing to take
high-productivity ways in production.

2. Theory
2.1 Cultural Gap and Cooperation
In a society, there are some different cultural groups 1. Each individual has a cultural
with
. Following Gradstein and Justman (2001), we
orientation denoted by
assume no cultural gap between members in each group. Cultural gap is denoted by

and

, where i and j are different individuals.
Cultural gap is related to economic activities in two aspects. The first is that it influences the
possibility of cooperation. We use
to represent the possibility of a successful cooperation,
and assume
with
, which means that for any two individuals, the
possibility of a successful transaction decreases as the cultural gap increases. In addition,
and
.
The second aspect is that cultural gap has a relation with the potential benefit of cooperation.
The potential benefit is denoted by , and it is assumed that
,
. We may
consider

as the return rate of investment or economic productivity. If we understand

as

economic productivity, then when an agent invests capital , she obtains
, where
is a
parameter reflecting scale economy. This assumption could be understood from the
perspective of social networks, especially with the knowledge of structural holes. A structural
hole is a void in a social structure, and in terms of social networks refers to an absence of
1

We may understand cultural groups as the elites and citizens.
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connections between groups (Jackson, 2008). According to Burt (2001), if an individual is
able to fill structural holes, he may end up with power and control over the flow of
information and bring favors between groups. It implies that the potential benefit of
cooperation between people with different cultural backgrounds may be substantial.
2.2 Democracy and Economic Productivity
We use a variable
to denote the level of democracy with

, where

is the worst situation. Democracy
represents the most democratic institutions and
influences the interpersonal communication between members of different cultural groups.
For example, in a democratic country people enjoy more freedom and more equal rights. The
elites cannot isolate themselves from the citizens because, for instance, they have to share
public facilities with citizens. On the other hand, a nondemocratic country is characterized by
more controls over citizens and less communication between the elites and citizens. 2
A person encounters a large number of people and tries to cooperate with them to produce a
common output . The number of people with the same cultural orientation is
. The
productivity of cooperating with those people is

with probability of 1, so risk is 0. The

number of encounters with different cultural orientation is

.

is related to the level of

democracy and it is assumed that
, where
is the upper bound of
. This
assumption is based on the understanding that, democracy, at the very least, includes equal
rights under the law, such as freedom of speech and assembly, equal access to social goods
and services. Democracy also includes equal rights in the economic sense, such as equal
access to education, health care and other social securities. Because in a democratic political
regime people from different classes have to enjoy social goods and services equally, they
have more chance to communicate with each other. By contrast, in a less democratic country,
the elites often control important resources and isolate themselves from the citizens who are
less privileged. As a result, it is less likely for people from different classes to make good
communication in such an unequal society.
A perspective explaining why the elites in an undemocratic political regime tend to isolate
themselves from the citizens is from the perspective of public services. Democratic states
earn fewer monopoly rents and produce a higher level of services than autocracies. It means
that in an undemocratic society, the elites, who control the government, tend to provide less
public service, while in a democratic society the government would supply much more public
services. As a result of limited supply of public services, the elites have to compete with
citizens in obtaining those services in an undemocratic society. Unsurprisingly, the simplest
way is to isolate themselves from the citizens and announce the access to some public
services as privileges of the elites. On the contrary, a democratic society is characterized by
more public services than its undemocratic counterparts. The elites, therefore, do not need to
establish many privileges so as to isolate themselves from the citizens. The result of less
competition between elites and the citizens is more possible cooperation and communication
between them.
The productivity of cooperating with them is
with the probability of
(
is the variance of productivity that equals to

and risk of
).

2

That is what happened in China. A vivid illustration is China’s Household Registration System. An extreme
example is the slavery institution.
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Agent

invest capital

productivity.

for the production and gains

, where

is the expected

All agents are risk averse with the utility function

, where

and

are expected productivity and risk of the investment portfolio.
and

are respectively proportions of capital invested in the cooperation with people of
. The agent divides

the same or different cultural groups, where
parts and divides

capital into

into

parts. So the risk of the production portfolio is

.
The utility maximization problem of agent

is described below.

;
It is not difficult to show that the optimal productivity
is related to the level of democracy,
and
. Therefore the expected output of the agent is
.
Through the process of proof, we can conclude that democracy increases economic
productivity through giving people more freedom so that they can build a larger interpersonal
network and reduce investment risk.
Proposition1: The optimal productivity is a positive function of democracy level, namely
and
.
Proof: Since
Since

,

can be written as

is independent and always bounded, we can transform the constraints

into

, where

and

maximization problem becomes

monotone positive relationship between
. Therefore

. So the

. The first order condition is
. We have

and

.

and
and

, which implies a
, because

,

,

.

3. Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and Methods
We are going to test the argument that democracy increases economic productivity. We
employ the method of Solow residual to calculate productivity. Production function is written
as
so that
, where
is
the total output,
is physical capital,
is human capital,
is population and
is
productivity. After estimating productivity, we analyze the influence of democracy on it. In
44
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the econometric model,
are control variables, and are country and time indicators
respectively. In order to deal with endogenous problem, we adopt the suggestion of Heid et al.
(2012) to employ system-GMM estimation, which is contributed by Arellano and Bover
(1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), since system-GMM performs well with highly persistent
data under mild assumptions.

An unbalanced panel with five-year interval from 1960 to 2000 is employed, which is taken
from Acemoglu et al. (2008). There are two different measures for democracy: the Freedom
House index and the composite Polity IV index, both of which range from 0 to 1, with 1
representing the most democratic political institution. We use the Freedom House index as
our main measure of democracy because of its broad coverage of countries and use Polity IV
index for comparison.
3.2 Empirical Results
We can find that democracy increases economic productivity. The results imply that if
democracy level increases by 1, economic productivity may increase 0.05 percent at most.
Although the temporary economic effect is not very large, the long-run effect (cumulative
effect) may be substantial. All of the estimations show that democracy has significant
influence on productivity. Therefore, we are able to conclude that our theoretical analysis is
credible.
Table1. Regression Results
Dependent Variable is
Freedom House Index

Control

Polity IV

OLS

Sys-GMM

Sys-GMM

OLS

Sys-GMM

Sys-GMM

0.97**

1.02**

1.05**

0.97**

1.04**

1.02**

(0.01)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.01)

(0.003)

(0.02)

0.03***

0.02***

0.004***

0.04***

0.03***

0.05**

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.04)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.04)

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Observations
547
547
534
502
502
502
*, ** and ***denotes the significance at the 10, 5 and 1percent level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. OLS
and sys-GMM are ordinary least squares estimation and system GMM estimation. I use proportion of the middle age as
control variable.

4. Conclusion
This paper basically completes the analysis of the relationship between democracy and
economic growth. In order to make clear whether democracy causes higher economic growth,
we build a model taking culture and cooperation into consideration. Through our empirical
analysis we find that Polity IV is more effective than Freedom House Index as the
consideration factor. We show that democracy allows people to build a larger interpersonal
network so as to reduce investment risk. As a result, they tend to use high-productivity (high
risk) methods in production.
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